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APOPLECTIC ABOUT HYPERLEXIS 
William D. Araiza*
 
 
Mila Sohoni’s article, The Idea of Too Much Law,1
I.  SOHONI’S CRITIQUE 
 provides a broad 
examination of “the hyperlexis critique”—in plain English, the claim that 
there is too much law, especially federal law.  This brief response begins 
with some observations about Sohoni’s taxonomy of hyperlexis claims.  It 
then offers a different, more narrative-based approach to the hyperlexis 
critique.  It concludes by suggesting that this alternate perspective may help 
provide substance to a critique that, as Sohoni correctly observes, is both 
difficult to pin down and thus engage, yet profoundly corrosive of the 
legitimacy of our regulatory system. 
After an introduction suggesting that all three federal branches have 
acknowledged a concern about hyperlexis,2 Sohoni moves on to discuss 
various “accounts”3 of hyperlexis.  Her “accounts,” however, reveal an 
ambiguity in her argument.  At times it is unclear whether Sohoni’s 
accounts focus on hyperlexis itself, or on dynamics that in turn generate 
hyperlexis.  For example, she notes arguments that federal laws are either 
too numerous or complex, claims that directly address hyperlexis.4  She 
then considers claims that Congress habitually exceeds its enumerated 
powers or delegates too much authority to administrative agencies.5  Unlike 
the numerosity and complexity claims, these latter arguments implicate 
hyperlexis only tangentially.  She then considers another direct hyperlexis 
claim—the argument that regulations are too costly.6  After considering 
these arguments’ implications, Sohoni ends with a “counsel of despair”7
 
*  Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Thanks to Mila Sohoni for the opportunity to 
respond to her thought-provoking article, and to Sara Bernstein and Kristie LaSalle for fine 
research assistance. 
 
that no principled critique can zero in on how one decides whether there is 
in fact too much law, coupled with the warning that the prevalence of the 
critique undermines faith in government. 
 1. 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585 (2012). 
 2. See id. at 1586–91. 
 3. Id. at 1601–22. 
 4. See id. at 1602–10. 
 5. See id. at 1610–14. 
 6. See id. at 1614–22. 
 7. Id. at 1631. 
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As suggested above, Sohoni’s taxonomy of arguments is somewhat 
confusing.  The numerosity, complexity, and cost arguments reflect direct 
claims of hyperlexis—arguments that, respectively, federal law is too 
verbose, complex, and expensive.  By contrast, the federalism and 
delegation arguments implicate hyperlexis only indirectly, through claims 
that, respectively, congressional over-stepping of the federal-state balance 
and over-delegation to regulatory agencies create conditions in which 
hyperlexis can occur.  While not a critical flaw in Sohoni’s argument, this 
conflation of direct and indirect causes makes it harder to focus 
methodically on the hyperlexis phenomenon. 
This confusion may reflect a deeper issue with Sohoni’s method.  She 
considers the hyperlexis critique as an abstract matter—hence her focus on 
concepts such as numerosity and complexity.  So understood, she is correct 
to find that critique lacking.  But abstract “accounts” of hyperlexis do not 
reflect the phenomenon as it is actually experienced.  Perhaps hyperlexis, 
like obscenity, can only be identified when one sees it.8
This response suggests that scholars examine the hyperlexis critique at a 
more granular level, focusing on popular perceptions rather than 
abstractions.  After all, if the hyperlexis critique flows fundamentally from 
such perceptions,
  If so, we may 
make more progress by reasoning from actual stories that implicate 
hyperlexis anxiety. 
9
II.  ONE EXAMPLE OF HYPERLEXIS ANXIETY:  MEET THE SACKETTS 
 then investigating those perceptions may better reveal 
the nature of the concerns.  In turn, that information may enable a more 
satisfying response. 
As one hyperlexis narrative, consider the story told by Chantell and 
Michael Sackett, the plaintiffs in Sackett v. EPA.10  Their story, involving 
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) administration of the Clean 
Water Act, constitutes the nightmare scenario—or perhaps one such 
scenario11
 
 8. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall 
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be [obscenity] . . . .  
But I know it when I see it . . . .”). 
—of those who worry about hyperlexis.  In 2007, the Sacketts 
began building a home on a residential homesite they owned in an Idaho 
subdivision.  The site was surrounded by homes and roads and otherwise 
indistinguishable from sites on which others had built single-family 
homes—the zoned use of the property.  Nevertheless, late that year, the 
EPA issued the Sacketts a compliance order under the Clean Water Act, 
alleging that their property contained wetlands, ordering them to stop 
construction and remediate the wetlands damage their construction caused, 
and requiring them to allow EPA access to the parcel and documents 
 9. See Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1586–87 (noting complaints about hyperlexis in the 
popular press and among political commentators). 
 10. 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012). 
 11. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing another scenario that may 
implicate hyperlexis fears). 
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relating to it.  The order warned that they were liable for fines of up to 
$75,000 for each day of non-compliance.  When the Sacketts sought 
judicial review of the order, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute precluded 
pre-enforcement review.  Thus, judicial review would have to await EPA’s 
decision to bring an enforcement action against them—a decision EPA 
might never make.12
The question before the Supreme Court was not the merits of the order—
i.e., whether the Sacketts’ property contained wetlands—but rather the 
availability of pre-enforcement review.  The Court’s unanimous answer, 
that such review was available,
 
13 was couched in the dry, technical jargon 
of the Administrative Procedure Act—mostly.14  But most relevant for our 
purposes is the tenor of the Sacketts’ factual narrative.  Their brief opens 
with the following sentence:  “The Clean Water Act casts a nationwide 
regulatory net that snags individual citizens doing ordinary, everyday 
activities.”15  The theme that the statute imposes unanticipated (indeed, 
unanticipatable) liabilities echoes through the rest of their fact statement.  
Thus, the brief states that “Michael and Chantall Sackett are individual 
citizens unwittingly ensnared in this regulatory net.”16  Not only were they 
performing “ordinary, everyday activities,”17 but their legal violation could 
not have been reasonably foreseen:  the brief observed that “[w]etlands 
are . . . defined by complex criteria . . . which defy consistent application 
and are not apparent to the average citizen.”18  Nor did anyone warn them 
that their conduct was close to a legal danger zone:  “The Sacketts had 
obtained no information that gave them any reason to believe that their 
property contained ‘wetlands’ regulated under the Clean Water Act.  They 
obtained all required local permits . . . .”19
The Sacketts’ legal argument about pre-enforcement review was, strictly 
speaking, distinct from this narrative.  But the unavailability of that review 
was no mere technical flaw.  Rather, adding legal force to their over-
regulation narrative, the unavailability of judicial review trapped the 
Sacketts in a regulatory house of mirrors, where penalties accumulated 
daily for failure to comply with an administrative order alleging a 
regulatory violation the judicial review of which could only be triggered by 
 
 
 12. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1369–73. 
 13. Id. at 1374 (finding that the compliance order constituted “final agency action” for 
purposes of judicial review, and that the Clean Water Act did not preclude such review). 
 14. But see id. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The position taken in this case by the 
Federal Government . . . would have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely 
at the mercy of [EPA] employees.”); id. (“And if the owners want their day in court to show 
that their lot does not include covered wetlands, well, as a practical matter, that is just too 
bad.”); id. (“In a nation that values due process, not to mention private property, such 
treatment is unthinkable.”). 
 15. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Sacket, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (No. 10-1062), 2011 WL 4500687, 
at *7. 
 16. Id. at 6. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 4. 
 19. Id. at 6. 
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the agency itself when—and if—it decided to bring an enforcement action.  
Too much law, indeed. 
III.  HYPERLEXIS RECONSIDERED 
In her article, Sohoni concludes that hyperlexis claims lack principled 
foundations, and thus cannot furnish the basis for a serious critique of our 
regulatory regime.  I believe she is correct:  abstract critiques of hyperlexis 
suffer from either logical flaws or the impossibility of establishing a 
coherent measurement metric.  One might cavil with her analysis here and 
there.  For example, Sohoni is probably too cavalier when she assumes that 
a tougher non-delegation doctrine would simply cause Congress to find new 
vehicles for enacting the same regulation.20  One reason Congress finds 
regulation attractive is exactly that the looseness of current non-delegation 
doctrine allows it to legislate at low cost.  Congress’s use of vague statutory 
language allows legislators both to achieve compromise and avoid taking 
heat for particular policies while taking credit for “doing something” about 
the given problem.21  But these are minor objections.  Overall, she is right 
to conclude that “critiques of hyperlexis are difficult to operationalize 
individually [and] their cross-cutting ramifications make them impossible to 
operationalize in concert.”22  She is also correct that accounts from 
democratic process breakdowns are “elusive.”23
By contrast, the Sacketts’ framing of their case provides insight—if only 
impressionistic—into the root complaints about hyperlexis.  The Sacketts 
portrayed themselves as “individual citizens doing ordinary, everyday 
activities,” when they were “unwittingly ensnared” in the Clean Water 
Act’s “nationwide regulatory net.”
 
24  As explained earlier, their legal 
argument addressed the lack of judicial review of the compliance order that 
ensnared them, not the scope or depth of the net per se.  These two facets of 
this case, however, combined to create a situation that led Justice Alito to 
ask the EPA’s lawyer at oral argument, “[I]f you related the facts of this 
case as they come to us to an ordinary homeowner, don’t you think most 
ordinary homeowners would say this kind of thing can’t happen in the 
United States?”25
What about the Sacketts’ story made Justice Alito so incredulous?  In the 
colloquy in which his question appeared, he painted a picture of the 
Sacketts’ plight: 
 
 
 20. See Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1613–14. 
 21. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and Political Advantage, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 218 (1992) (credit-taking); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the 
Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State:  Beyond the New Deal, 32 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 955 (2000) (compromise). 
 22. Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1622. 
 23. Id. at 1624. 
 24. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15, at 4, 6. 
 25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 10-
1062). 
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You . . . buy property to build a house.  You think maybe there’s a little 
drainage problem in part of your lot.  So, you start to build the house, and 
then you get an order from the EPA which says:  You have filled in 
wetlands; so, you can’t build your house.  Remove the fill, put in all kinds 
of plants, and now you have to let us on your premises whenever we want 
to.  You have to turn over to us all sorts of documents, and for every day 
that you don’t do all this, you’re accumulating a potential fine of $75,000.  
And, by the way, there’s no way you can go to court to challenge our 
determination that this is a wetlands until such time as we choose to sue 
you.26
Justice Alito might as well have been paraphrasing the Sacketts’ self-
narrative.  Add in the lack of prompt judicial review of the agency’s 
determination, and one can understand Justice Alito’s exclamation in his 
concurring opinion:  “unthinkable.”
 
27
This description illustrates one variation of hyperlexis, what we can call 
the “lightning bolt.”  In this scenario, law reaches so broadly, deeply, and 
unpredictably that it traps individuals doing things they would never expect 
to trigger legal liability.  So understood, the hyperlexis critique comes into 
focus:  the problem in this scenario is not too many laws, or overly 
expensive or even complex laws, but laws that prohibit innocuous conduct 
that normal, law-abiding citizens engage in every day. 
 
This understanding of hyperlexis eases some of the analytical difficulties 
Sohoni identifies.  For example, she rightly notes that determining the 
complexity of a legal rule is itself quite difficult, thus rendering unhelpful 
what she calls “the Argument from Complexity.”28  Is a terse but vague tort 
rule (such as, “don’t be negligent”) more complex than detailed regulations 
governing how one acts in the world?  Sohoni rightly notes the elusiveness 
of a principled answer to that question, as well as to questions about 
numerosity and costs.  But the lightning bolt critique of hyperlexis points at 
a different inquiry:  whether in some fundamental way it is unanticipated 
that certain conduct will trigger legal liability.29
As befits a generalized public anxiety about law, this critique finds 
expression in both popular imagination and legal doctrine.  As to the 
former, we know of the Stalin-era fear of the midnight knock on the door, 
the sign that you have done something to get on the secret police’s list.  
Straddling public imagination and legal doctrine is the narrative of 
landowners finding themselves suddenly subject to all the restrictions of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) when a single animal, usually an 
insignificant or humorous-sounding one, is found scurrying across one’s 
 
 
 26. Id. at 37–38. 
 27. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (Alito, J., concurring); supra note 14. 
 28. Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1607. 
 29. Indeed, Sohoni cites Richard Epstein’s argument that legal complexity comprises the 
degree to which a legal rule “has pervasive application across routine social activities.” Id. 
(quoting RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 29 (1995)).  As 
explained in the text, my argument goes beyond mere pervasive application, to consider the 
degree to which enforcement of such a rule can be perceived as arbitrary. 
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property.30  At the other extreme of seriousness are the views of Supreme 
Court justices who voted to invalidate the death penalty because it was 
imposed so arbitrarily.31
But the lightning bolt critique implicates more than simple freakishness.  
It also reflects anxiety about the breadth and depth of the law, which 
ensures that any citizen, doing any commonplace thing, might be struck at 
any time.  Anyone—not just a political opponent or a convicted murderer—
is subject to the lightning bolt.
  What unites these examples is the freakishness of 
the liability imposed:  you did something—who knows what?—to get your 
name on the secret police list, a “hapless toad” happened to crawl across 
your property, or you happened to be the one murder defendant out of a 
hundred whose jury decided on death. 
32  Thus, this critique also implies a public 
intuition about what conduct is legitimate, as encompassed in the Sacketts’ 
self-description as “individual citizens doing ordinary, everyday 
activities.”33
Under this critique, it is irrelevant whether tort liability is imposed via a 
“simple” common law rule or a “complex” set of regulations.  Everyone 
understands that if you act carelessly, you may be sued.  But nobody thinks 
that building a house in a residential subdivision risks liability.  Everyone 
does it.  It is innocent conduct.  How can it be wrong?  And if it is wrong, 
then something is wrong with the law.  If anyone can be snagged by a 
regulatory net when simply minding her own business, then that net must be 
too wide. 
 
CONCLUSION:  HYPERLEXIS FROM THE GROUND UP 
The Sacketts’ narrative complements Sohoni’s more abstract 
investigation of hyperlexis.  It translates anxiety about hyperlexis as anxiety 
about arbitrary thunderbolts of liability hurled down (in particular, from 
afar) to strike innocent people engaging in innocuous activities.  True or 
not, the story of a couple doing what many Americans do every day (and 
what many would like to do) when they were suddenly accosted by faraway 
 
 30. See, e.g., Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting from rehearing en banc) (describing “the taking [under the ESA] of a 
hapless toad, that for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California”); Laura J. 
Hendrickson, Coverage of the Endangered Species Act in Four Major Newspapers, 45 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 135, 162 (2005) (discussing this phenomenon). 
 31. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293–95 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. 
at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 32. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 29 (“The criminal law of homicide . . . provides its 
own safe harbor:  don’t kill anyone.  In contrast, the rules regulating the use of property or 
the hiring and firing of workers, or even the selling of products or the buying and selling of 
companies, provide no similar haven.  Rather these rules routinely intrude into the lives of 
ordinary productive people, and are not directed to the destructive activities of a very small 
portion of the population.  For my purposes at least, a complex rule is one that . . . has 
pervasive application across routine social activities, and is not directed solely to the 
dangerous activities of people who live at the margins of society.  Legal complexity is not 
merely a simple measure of the inherent or formal properties of legal rules.  It is also a 
function of how deeply they cut into the fabric of ordinary life.”). 
 33. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15, at 4. 
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bureaucrats and slapped with massive unreviewable daily fines seems 
“unthinkable.”34  The violent disabusal of their intuition that they were 
doing nothing even remotely wrong surely engenders suspicion that maybe 
there is too much law.  The resonance of their story35
The Sacketts’ story does not reflect the only plausible version of 
hyperlexis anxiety.  For example, one might also tell stories of businesses 
suffering under comically paternalistic over-regulation, as when Ronald 
Reagan famously claimed that Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration (OSHA) had issued over 100 rules addressing how to climb 
a ladder.
 suggests that, at least 
in the popular mind, there may in fact be something to the hyperlexis 
critique. 
36
The ultimate point is that Sohoni’s failure to find rubrics that “identify, 
measure, and critique”
  That hyperlexis critique is different from the one implied by the 
Sacketts’ story.  One can easily frame other narratives as well. 
37 the hyperlexis phenomenon calls for a more 
inductive approach that understands the hyperlexis critique as taking shape 
from individual stories.  By examining those stories, we may develop a 
more helpful taxonomy of hyperlexis complaints based on substantive 
categories (for example, the thunderbolt story) rather than abstract 
explanations such as numerosity and over-delegation.  These more 
informative categories may help us better identify the scope of any actual 
hyperlexis problem.  If the stories reveal a non-existent problem, or one not 
flowing from anything identifiable as hyperlexis, then scholars may be able 
to rebut the claim and thus blunt what Sohoni correctly identifies as the 
corrosive force the hyperlexis claim exerts on our governmental 
institutions.38  And if those complaints do suggest real hyperlexis, they can 
be resolved on their own terms, and not through blunderbuss approaches 
such as the generally ill-conceived regulatory reform proposals currently 
pending in Congress.39
 
 34. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 
 35. For one example of how the popular media viewed the Sacketts’ case, see ‘Little 
Guy’ Wins High Court Fight over Property Rights, CNN (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-03-21/us/us_scotus-property-rights_1_property-rights-high-
court-clean-water-act?_s=PM:US. 
 36. See, e.g., Robert Stiff, A Battle Best Not Waged, EVENING INDEP., May 1980, at 1A.  
According to this source, Reagan’s claim was false. 
 37. Sohoni, supra note 1, at 1601. 
 38. See id. at 1628–31. 
 39. See id. at 1592–94 (discussing these proposals); William D. Araiza, Regulatory 
Changes, Part 3:  Curbing Independent Agencies’ Independence(?), PRAWFSBLAWG (Nov. 
30, 2011, 7:23 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/11/regulatory-
changes-part-3.html (same). 
